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Abstract
An architecture is described for designing systems that acquire and manip-
ulate large amounts of unsystematized, or so-called commonsense, knowledge.
Its aim is to exploit to the full those aspects of computational learning that are
known to oer powerful solutions in the acquisition and maintenance of robust
knowledge bases. The architecture makes explicit the requirements on the basic
computational tasks that are to be performed and is designed to make these
computationally tractable even for very large databases. The main claims are
that (i) the basic learning tasks are tractable and (ii) tractable learning oers
viable approaches to a range of issues that have been previously identied as
problematic for articial intelligence systems that are entirely programmed. In
particular, attribute eciency holds a central place in the denition of the learn-
ing tasks, as does also the capability to handle relational information eciently.
Among the issues that learning oers to resolve are robustness to inconsisten-
cies, robustness to incomplete information and resolving among alternatives.
1 Introduction
We take the view that intelligence is a large scale computational phenomenon. It
is associated with large amounts of knowledge, abilities to manipulate this knowl-
edge to derive conclusions about situations not previously experienced, the capability
to acquire more knowledge, and the ability to learn and apply strategies of some

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complexity. The large scale nature of the phenomenon suggests two prerequisites for
constructing articial systems with these characteristics. First, some theoretical ba-
sis has to be found within which the various apparent impediments to this endeavor
that have been identied can be addressed systematically. Second, some large-scale
experiments need to be conducted to validate the suggested basis { it is possible that
the fundamental phenomena do not scale down and that small-scale experiments do
not throw light on them.
Much eort has been devoted to identifying such a theoretical basis. One major
thrust has been to develop denitions of capabilities that are functionally adequate.
Functionalities that, even if realized, would not go far towards achieving a signicant
level of performance are of little interest. Another thrust has been the search for
capabilities that are demonstrably computationally feasible. Functionalities that are
computationally intractable are again of little direct interest. A third viewpoint is
that of biological plausibility. Perhaps an understanding of how cortex is constrained
to perform these tasks would suggest specic mechanisms that the other viewpoints
are not able to provide.
The hypothesis of this paper is that for intelligent systems to be realized the sought
after theoretical basis has not only to be discovered, but needs to be embodied in an
architecture that oers guidelines for constructing them. Composed as these systems
will be of possibly numerous components, each performing a dierent function, and
each connected to the others in a possibly complex overall design, there will need to
be some unity of nature among the components, their interfaces, and the mechanisms
they use.
We shall describe a candidate for such an architecture. This candidate emerged
from a study that attempted to look at the issues of functional adequacy, compu-
tational feasibility and biological constraints together [52]. We call the architecture
neuroidal since it respects the most basic constraints imposed by that model of neural
computation. One feature of that study was that it was a \whole systems" study. It
addressed a range of issues simultaneously insisting on biological and computational
feasibility, plausible and simple interactions with the outside world, and adequate ex-
planations about the internal control of the system. While denitions of intelligence,
thinking and consciousness have all proved elusive, it appears that the basic compu-
tational substrate that neural systems have to support to realize these phenomena
might be identied more easily. We believe that the functions and mechanisms associ-
ated with this substrate characterize an area and style of computation that is suitably
referred to as cognitive computation.
In abstracting an AI architecture from that neural study, as we do here, we dis-
pense with some of the most onerous constraints considered there to be imposed by
biology. In the mammalian brain these constraints include, among others, the spar-
sity of the interconnections among the components, the inaccessibility of the separate
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components to an external teacher or trainer, and certain bounds on the weights of in-
dividual synapses. In articial systems these constraints are not fundamental, and in
order to maximize the computational power of the architecture we will free ourselves
of them here.
Our purpose in describing the architecture is to suggest it as a basis for large scale
experiments. The rst critical question we ask is whether it is theoretically adequate:
Can some of the obstacles that have been identied by researchers be solved, in
principle, within the model? Are there further fundamental obstacles? The second
critical question, which will need to be resolved empirically, is whether systems based
on this architecture can indeed be constructed, that exhibit the phenomena outlined
in our rst paragraph to a more signicantly extent than current systems.
As to the rst question we observe that the McCulloch-Pitts model may be viewed
as a valid architecture for intelligence, if one accepts threshold elements as represent-
ing the basic steps of cortical computation. Its shortcoming, clearly, is that it does
not appear to oer useful guidelines for constructing systems.
Our architecture, in contrast, is designed to provide a design methodology. In
particular, its main feature is that it comes with a set of associated algorithms and
mechanisms. The basic constituents of the architecture are classical enough, being
circuit units consisting of linear threshold elements, and short term memory devices
called image units. The novelty is that for aggregates of such devices we can detail how
the accompanying mechanisms can perform, at least in principle, a list of tasks that
address signicant problems. The bulk of this paper is devoted to enumerating these
problems and describing how they can be addressed. Our purpose here is to point
out that this broad variety of mechanisms can be supported on this single unied
architecture, and that together, they go some way toward addressing an impressive
array of problems.
There will remain the second question as to how to validate the architecture.
As we shall suggest, this raises pragmatic issues that had previously received only
limited attention. The mechanisms provided emphasize the centrality of learning for
multiple purposes, from basic knowledge acquisition to ensuring robust behavior. To
construct a system one would need to do a high level design as well as, possibly,
some programming, although the main benet of the architecture is the potential for
massive knowledge infusion by learning.
If one is to realize a capability for massive knowledge infusion, we expect that
there will be needed a signicant new kind of eort directed towards the preparation
of teaching materials. Ideally available resources such as dictionaries and annotated
corpora of text should be usable. However, since the system will not operate identically
to humans, the teaching materials needed cannot be expected to be identical to those
that are eective for humans. The system and teaching materials need to be chosen
so as to t each other, and we believe that the development of these in tandem is a
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major challenge for future research. Although, clearly, there is much data available in
natural language form, aside from the issue of natural language understanding, there
is the independent question of whether these materials, without annotations, make
explicit all the commonsense and other information that would be needed.
To summarize, the main feature of the architecture is that it brings learning to
the heart of the general AI problem. Recent advances in machine learning help us to
distinguish those aspects of learning that have very eective computational solutions,
from those for which none is known. Thus in a learning task the problem of nding new
compound features that are particularly eective is not one to which general eective
solutions are known. In contrast, we know that the presence of irrelevant features
can be tolerated in very large numbers, without degrading learning performance, for
some classes of functions. Our proposal is that these insights be incorporated into the
design of AI systems. We claim that this approach does oer a new view of some of
the now traditional issues of AI. It also raises some new questions particularly with
regard to the training of such systems.
On a historical note it is interesting to recall Turing's 1950 paper on \Computing
Machinery and Intelligence" in which he describes his \Test". While he considers the
possibility that a programmed system might be built to solve it, he appears to come
out in favor of a learning machine. In the subsequent history of research on general
intelligent systems, the overwhelming emphasis has been on programmed systems. We
believe that this was largely because there existed a mathematical basis for following
this avenue, namely mathematical logic. However, in the intervening years there has
been much progress both on the theoretical foundations of machine learning, as well
as in the experimental study of learning algorithms. It is, therefore, appropriate now
to reexamine whether a synthesis can be found that resolves Turing's dilemma.
2 The Architecture
A system having the proposed architecture is composed of a number of circuit units
and a number of image units. The image units can be thought of as the working
memory of the system. During reasoning processes that is where the intermediate
results of the reasoning computations are stored. The circuit units are the long term
repositories of knowledge. Their behavior can be updated by both inductive learning
and explicit programming.
The circuit units are dened so as to ensure that they provably have certain
desirable learning capabilities. For this reason, we dene them to consist of one layer
of linear threshold gates or elements. The circuit units have one layer of inputs that
are the inputs to these gates, and one layer of outputs that are the outputs of the
gates themselves. The weights of the threshold elements can be either learned or
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programmed.
The intention is that each gate recognize some predicate. We say that it \res"
if such recognition has occurred in the sense that the output has taken value one or
\true". The inputs may be Boolean or real valued. The latter is needed if some of the
input devices or image units produce numerical values (or if we go outside the strict
model by allowing, for example, the outputs, of gates to be numerical functions of
the linear sums.).
The image units are short term repositories of information with unspecied for-
mat. Their outputs are regarded as preprogrammed feature detectors and the inputs
include preprogrammed inverse features. For Boolean outputs, each output feature
will have value one for some information contents and zero for others. As input the
image may take information from a sensory device such as a camera. In addition the
inputs to an image unit may be of the form of inverse features that modify the con-
tents of the image so as to make some associated feature detectors re. For example,
the image unit may have a feature detector that res if the image contains a depiction
of an elephant, and it may also have an inverse feature that can create in the image
the illusion of an elephant in the sense that the information it creates in the image
makes the elephant feature detector re. Thus image units can be used both to store
information received from the outside world through sensory devices, as well as to
store \imaginary constructs" that are useful for the system's internal computational
processes. It is possible to have a number of such constructs in the image simulta-
neously in a novel combination. The system can then bring the power of its circuits
to bear on a representation of a complex situation not previously represented in it.
Both preprogrammed features and preprogrammed inverse features can be composed
using the circuit units to create nodes that act as higher level features or inverse
features. Thus the elephant instance may be more plausibly realized at a higher level
in a hierarchy.
The circuit and image units will be composed together in a block diagram so that
the outputs of some of the units are identied with the inputs of others. Typically
image units will interface directly with circuit units, rather than other image units.
Some inputs are identied with the outputs of input devices, and some outputs with
the inputs of output devices. The block diagram may ultimately contain feedback or
cycles.
Some rules are further specied for how the circuits can change in the process of
knowledge acquisition. For the gates, linear threshold units in our case, some update
rules are given, such as the perceptron algorithm [42] or Winnow [26], that specify
the supervised inductive learning process. In addition some further rules are given to
allow the acquisition of programmed knowledge. In particular new output gates may
be added and the parameters or weights of that gate assigned appropriate values so
that it res under the intended conditions. These added gates can then also serve as
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targets for inductive learning or as inputs to other units. One method of adding to
the circuit is to add gates to represent various xed functions of existing nodes so as
to enrich the feature space. Thus one may add nodes that compute the conjunction
of all pairs from a certain set of existing nodes. Another method of programming a
circuit is to change a weight between an existing pair of nodes. Thus, one can create a
subcircuit to realize \grass) green" by making the weight from the node representing
\grass" to that representing \green" larger than the threshold.
2.1 Overview
We shall outline here the properties that are required for a device to be an image
unit. In the section to follow we shall describe one particular realization of image
units that is based on predicate calculus and highlights how our approach can be
used to generalize the capabilities of logic based AI systems.
An image unit will at any instant contain some data that we call the scene S. The
scene itself consists of a number of objects a
1
;    ; a
s
as well as information about the
properties of the objects and about the relationships amongst them. This information
may be represented, in principle, in any number of ways, of which predicate calculus
is one.
The computational processes that we describe are entirely in terms of interactions
between the circuit units and the image units. Since we are free to limit the number
of objects in the image units to some moderate number 
, say equal to 10, we are
able to limit ab initio the computational cost of the so-called binding problem, that
grows with this number.
Even when we use standard logical notation to describe the contents of the image
or to label circuit nodes, our interpretation of it is slightly dierent from the usual.
In particular the objects in our architecture are best viewed as internal artifacts in
the system. They are not intended to refer to the external world in the same direct
way as in more familiar uses of the predicate calculus. Further, the primary semantics
that we ascribe to nodes in the system are the PAC semantics described in the next
section, rather than the standard semantics of predicate calculus.
Each node of a circuit unit is in some state. Most simply, it is in one of two
states that indicates whether or not the predicate is true of the current scene in the
image unit. However, it can contain further information, such as a real number that
expresses a condence level for the validity of the predicate. (c.f. neuroids in [52]).
Each node can be thought of as representing an existentially quantied relation,
e.g.
9x
1
9x
2
9x
3
R(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
)
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where the existentially quantied variables range over the objects a
1
;    ; a


in the
scene. The threshold will re, in general, if this expression holds for the current scene.
While no general assumptions are made about how R is represented, it is assumed
that when this relation is recognized to hold for the current scene, a corresponding
binding, or mapping  from fx
1
; x
2
; x
3
g ! fa
1
;    ; a


g is made explicit in the system.
For brevity, where this leads to no ambiguity, we shall use R variously to refer to the
predicate computed, the value of the predicate or to the node itself.
An aggregate of circuit units is a directed graph in which each pair of nodes that
is connected is associated with a weight. Each node has an update function that
updates its state as a function of its previous state, the states of nodes from which
there are directed edges to it as well as the weights of these edges. More particularly
each circuit unit is a directed graph of depth one (i.e. one layer of input nodes, one
layer of output nodes, and no \hidden layer") and the update functions are linear
threshold functions.
An important aspect of the circuits is that a directed edge from node representing
R
1
to a node representing R
2
contains binding information called the connection bind-
ingR
1
! R
2
. If the nodes represent 9x
1
9x
2
9x
3
R
1
(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
) and 9y
1
9y
2
9y
3
R
2
(y
1
; y
2
; y
3
)
then the binding information could specify, for example, that x
1
and y
2
have to rep-
resent the same object but that x
2
; x
3
; y
1
and y
3
may be objects arbitrarily dierent
from each other. For this reason there may be several connections from R
1
to R
2
, each
one corresponding to a dierent connection binding and having a dierent weight. For
example, if R
2
represents the notion of grandparent and R
1
that of parent then in
the denition of the former one may wish to invoke the latter twice with dierent
bindings.
The scene S in an image unit contains information about which relations hold for
which object sets. An aggregate of circuit units can be evaluated for S node by node.
For a node that represents relation 9x
1
;    ; 9x
i
R(x
1
;    ; x
i
) the set of all bindings
fx
1
;    ; x
i
g ! fa
1
;    ; a


g that make R hold will be evaluated. If the node R has
inputs from nodes R
1
and R
2
, and the gate at R evaluates the threshold function
R
1
+ R
2
 2, then R will re for a binding  if there exist bindings 
1
; 
2
of the
variables of R
1
and R
2
that respect the respective connection bindings R
1
! R and
R
2
! R; and make both R
1
and R
2
true. We shall expand on this in the next section.
2.2 An Implementation
We shall describe an implementation that is based on predicate calculus, but extends
it in the direction advocated in this paper, so as to allow for eective learning, with
attribute eciency and error resilience. In particular, a programmed system in which
knowledge is described as Horn clauses, and modus ponens is used as the rule of
inference, can be embedded into this framework. The central role in AI systems of
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this language of description is discussed by Russell and Norvig ([45] pp 265-277).
We are claiming, therefore, that in at least this one possible implementation of our
architecture, it is the case that a signicant class of existing programmed systems
can be embedded. Systems so embedded would then have the addition benets of a
powerful learning capability.
Let us consider the following restriction of the language of predicate calculus (e.g.
[45] p. 186). As constants we will choose the base objects A
B
= fa
1
;    ; a


g of the
image unit. We allow a set R
B
of base relations of arities that are arbitrary but upper
bounded by a constant . We use no function symbols. We represent variable names
by fx
1
;    ; x
n
g and relations will be dened in terms of these.
The two features of predicate calculus that we exclude, therefore, are constants
that refer directly to individuals in the world (e.g. Shakespeare), and functions that
can be applied to them to refer to other individuals (e.g. Mother of (Shakespeare).).
In our system the only constants are the predened base objects of the image, which
are internal constructs of the systems. In order to refer to an individual like Shake-
speare we shall use a unary predicate that can be applied to a base object. Thus
Shakespeare(a
3
) would express the fact that a
3
has the attributes of Shakespeare.
Also, we dispense with function symbols by referring to the resulting object as a base
object, and by expressing the necessary relation by an appropriate relation symbol.
Thus instead of saying x
1
= Mother of(x
2
) we would say Mother of(x
1
; x
2
); where the
latter is a binary relation. In these ways we ensure that the two linguistic restrictions,
on constants and functions symbols, do not restrict what can be expressed.
A term will be therefore a base object a
i
and an atomic sentence will be a single
relation such as Mother of 2 R
B
applied to one or a collection of base objects (e.g.
Mother of(a
3
; a
7
).) A Horn rule will be an implication
R
i
1
(x
i
1
;1
;   x
i
1
;(i
1
)
) ^    ^ R
i
r
(x
i
r
;1
;    ; x
i
r
;(i
r
)
)
) R
i
r+1
(x
i
r+1
;1
;    ; x
i
r+1
;(i
r+1
)
): (1)
where R
i
j
2 R
B
and (k) is the arity of R
k
2 R
B
. We note that R
B
may include the
relation False that has zero arguments, that signies logical impossibility and may be
used meaningfully for R
i
r+1
on the right-hand side of an implication. Implications are
to be interpreted as quantied universally over all the x variables that occur in them
but these quantiers are omitted for brevity.
A binding is a mapping from fx
1
;    ; x
n
g to fa
1
;    ; a


g. We say that a relation
R(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
) is made true by  if R((x
1
); (x
2
); (x
3
)); or R((x)) for short, holds.
The derivation rule modus ponens is the following:
\if R
i
1
(x) ^    ^ R
i
r
(x) ) R
i
r+1
(x)" is a rule,
and if, for some binding ; R
i
j
((x)) holds for 1  j  r;
then R
i
r+1
((x)) also holds:
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In a logic based system we would program a set of rules of the form (1) and
consider the input to be a set of atomic sentences. We could then consider the output
to be the set of all atomic sentences that can be deduced from the input by applying
the rules using modus ponens in all possible ways. This output could be derived in
the logical framework by means of forward chaining ([45]p. 273.).
Let us now describe the implementation of the neuroidal architecture into which
this process embeds naturally. In this implementation the contents of the image will
be simply the atomic sentences of the input. The circuits will implement the rules
as follows: For each relation R(x) 2 R
B
there will be a gate in the circuit. We shall
assume that each relation R occurs on the right-hand side in just one rule { otherwise
we replace multiple occurrences of R on the right hand side by dierent names, say
R
1
; R
2
;    ; R
m
and add a new rule R
1
_ R
2
_    _ R
m
) R.
For each Horn rule R
i
1
^ R
i
2
^    ^ R
i
r
) R
i
r+1
we shall make a connection to
R
i
r+1
from each R
i
j
(1  j  r). This connection will have the appropriate connection
binding, dened below. At the R
i
r+1
node we shall implement the equivalent of an
AND gate in terms of a threshold gate with threshold r. In other words, we regard
the values of the R
i
j
as Boolean f0; 1g, and have a gate that realizes.
R
i
r+1
= 1 if and only if
r
X
j=1
R
i
j
 r:
Executing this threshold gate will correspond, therefore, to performing one application
of modus ponens.
To simulate OR gates, which are needed if multiple occurrences of the same re-
lation occurs on the right hand side, we also use a threshold gate but have 1 as the
threshold instead of r, i.e.
P
R
i
k
 1.
The further detail that needs to be claried is the nature and meaning of the
connection bindings. Each rule with r relations on the left denes r connections and
connection bindings. Consider the following rule with r = 2:
R
1
(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
) ^ R
2
(x
3
; x
4
; x
5
)) R
3
(x
2
; x
3
; x
5
): (2)
This notation expresses the connection bindings implicitly. The binding of the con-
nection from R
1
to R
3
says simply that the second parameter of R
1
binds with the
rst parameter of R
3
and the third parameter of R
1
with the second of R
3
, and that
there are no other constraints. The naming of the variables in each rule or gate can
express this precisely. Note that in this example the implication is that any bind-
ing of x
1
that makes R
1
true can be combined with any binding for x
4
that makes
R
2
true. For example, if elsewhere, we have the rules R
4
(x
7
) ) R
1
(x
7
; x
8
; x
9
) and
R
4
(x
7
) ) R
2
(x
10
; x
7
; x
11
), then it will be sucient for these rules to be satised for
distinct values of (x
7
) since (2) did not require otherwise.
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If from some R
i
there is more than one connection, then for conceptual purposes
it is simplest to think about a circuit in which the R
i
is replicated so that each node
has just one connection directed away from it and hence the circuit is a tree. In other
words connection bindings restrict the multiple inputs to a node but never the multiple
outputs. Note also that any correspondence between two variables occurring in two
relations on the left hand side (i.e. x
3
in this example,) can be enforced only by having
x
3
as an explicit variable in the right hand side relation, (i.e. R
3
in the example.)
This can be circumvented by dening a node that represents a particular compound
relation e.g. we could create a gate for computing R
1
(x
1
; x
2
; x
3
) ^ R
2
(x
3
; x
4
; x
5
); call
it R
5
(x
2
; x
5
) and have an implication R
5
(x
2
; x
5
) ) R
3
(x
2
; x
5
) if we wish to avoid
mentioning x
3
in R
3
.
In this implementation we consider the network to evaluate for each gate all pos-
sible bindings  : fx
1
;    ; x
n
g ! fa
1
;    ; a


g so as to nd all the ones, if any, that
make the gate evaluate to one. To do this we shall, for simplicity, impose here the
constraint that aggregates of circuit units are acyclic. We can then form a topological
sort of their nodes (e.g. Knuth [23] ) and for one such topologically sorted order eval-
uate each node in succession. The evaluation of each node is for all the 

d
bindings
, where d <  is the arity of the relation R at that node. (Allowing cycles would al-
low recursive rules to be expressed, but would make the evaluation mechanisms more
complex. If the circuits express Horn rules, or other rules in which no negative weights
occur, then evaluating circuits with cycles can still be done in time polynomial in 


and the number of gates.)
In this graph the input nodes with no predecessors will represent relations them-
selves. To evaluate a gate at R, we simply enumerate all the 

d
bindings of the d
variables that appear in it. First we scan all the atomic sentences in the image that
contain R and see which bindings make R true, before any rules are applied. Then
for each binding, and for each predecessor node, if any, we determine whether that
binding can make the predecessor true. Having done this for each predecessor, we can,
for each binding compute the value of the gate at the current node, whether it is a
disjunction, conjunction, or more generally, an arbitrary linear threshold gate. Note
that the complexity of this task that is contributed by the binding problem is 

d
. It
is exponential in the maximum arity of the relations, and not in the number of base
objects or the number of relations in a rule! (Note, however that this arity may be
made larger by the restriction that all binding information is in the connections. This
necessitates that if some correspondences among the variables need to be enforced on
the left hand side of a rule, they must be made explicit on the right hand side. For
example if we wish to represent father(x; z)^ mother(z; y)) grandfather(x; y) then
in our representation grandfather will need to have a third argument, say t, that is
to be identied with the two occurrences of z by the connection bindings.)
It is easy to verify that this evaluation algorithm computes all satisfying bindings
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for each relation that is represented at some node, in exactly the same way as would
applying modus ponens in all possible ways to the rules.
From what has been said it should be clear that our architecture is expressive
enough that programmed systems based on the Horn rules we have described and
modus ponens can be embedded into it. What the architecture adds to such systems
is a capability for learning. The point is that the gates we allow are not just Boolean
conjunctions and disjunctions, but linear threshold functions. This allows a host of
learning algorithms, discussed in later sections, that provide a provable learning ca-
pability that is not known to be available in strictly logical representations.
In conclusion we note that there are theoretical results that show for certain classes
of Boolean functions that extending the representation of the learner to threshold
functions makes the original class polynomial time learnable, while restricting the
learner to the minimal representation needed for expressing these functions would
make the task NP-compete [40]. Our richer representation, therefore, has not only the
obvious advantage of being able to express more, but has the additional computational
benets of making Boolean domains potentially easier to learn. Also, while the quoted
result discusses the polynomial time criterion for learning, as we shall discuss at
length, we also desire and seek the further advantages that learning be achieved with
attribute-eciency and error-resilience.
3 Semantics
We cannot expect to develop a set of robust mechanisms for processing representations
of knowledge without a robust semantics for the representation. The emphasis here
is both on the necessity of semantics, that relates the representation to some reality
beyond itself, as well as robustness to the many uncertainties, changes and errors in
the world or in communications with the world, that the system will need to cope
with.
The need for semantics has explained the attractiveness of formal logic in AI
research. It is the need for robustness that forces us to look beyond logic, at notions
centered on learning. The semantics we shall describe here, PAC circuit semantics, or
PAC semantics for short, is based on the notion of computationally feasible learning
of functions that are probably approximately correct [50].
To explain the contrast in viewpoints consider the situation calculus described in
McCarthy and Hayes [30]. There, a situation is \the complete state of the world",
and general facts are relations among situations. Thus P ) Q means that for all
situations for which P holds Q holds also. This is an all embracing claim about the
universe that is dicult to grade gracefully and becomes problematic in the real world
where authoritative denitions of P and Q themselves may be dicult to identify.
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In contrast, PAC semantics makes qualied behavioral assertions about the com-
putational behavior of a particular system in a particular environment. In PAC se-
mantics P and Q would be dened as functions computed by xed algorithms or
circuits within a system that takes input through a xed feature set from a xed but
arbitrarily complex world. The inputs range over a set X that consists of all possible
combinations of feature values that the input feature detectors can detect. There is
a probability distribution D over this set X that summarizes the world in all the
aspects that are discernible to the feature detectors of the system. The P and Q
could correspond to nodes in a circuit. The relationship between P and Q would be
typically of the following form: if a random example is taken from D that satises
P , then it also satises Q with a certain probability. The latter would, at best, be
known to be in some range with a certain condence. Thus the semantics is relative to
both the computational and sensory abilities of the system, and refers to an outside
world about which direct observations can be made only one observation at a time.
The claims that are made about the semantics do not go beyond what is empirically
veriable in a computational feasible way by the system operating in the world. In
addition to making observations from D, the system can also acquire rules by being
told them. It can then use these as working hypotheses, subject to subsequent empir-
ical testing by the system in the PAC sense, and make deductions using them. The
general goal of the system is to learn from D the invariants of the world.
In constructing an articial system we envisage that each circuit unit can be
trained separately. The unit will take as inputs the outputs of input devices or other
circuit or image units to which it is connected. Thus it would see the world through a
set of features that are themselves ltered through the input devices and circuits of the
system. In contrast, the outputs of the unit being trained will be directly accessible
to the trainer, who can venture to train each such output to behave as is desired.
We note that if the system consists of a chain of circuit units trained in sequence
in the above manner then the errors in one circuit do not necessarily propagate to
the next. Each circuit will be accurate in the PAC sense as a function of the external
inputs { the fact that intermediate levels of gates only approximate the functions that
the trainer intended is not necessarily harmful. At each internal level these internal
feature sets may permit accurate PAC learning at that next stage.
Since our architecture can perform computations via the image units that are more
dynamic than the conventional view of circuits allows the terminology of circuits is
best viewed as an analogy. The more general computational functions of the system,
including those that use the image for reasoning as outlined in x4.8, for example, all
need to be eective in the PAC sense.
The key advantage of PAC semantics is that it gives an intellectual basis for
understanding learning and thereby validates empiricism and procedural views of
knowledge. Inductive learning will be the key to overcoming the impediments that
12
are to be enumerated in the next section. These will include defaults, nonmonotonic
reasoning, inconsistent data, and resolving among alternatives. Intelligent systems
will inevitably meet the dilemmas that these issues raise but they will have a learned
response to all but the rarer manifestations of them.
We mention that PAC learning, when oered as a basis for intelligent systems
or cognitive science, suggests the following view. The world is arbitrarily complex
and there is little hope that any system will ever be able to describe it in detail.
Nevertheless by learning some simple computational circuits such systems can learn to
cope, even in a world as complex as it is. Most often these circuits will be deterministic.
It is the complexities of the world and the uncertainties in the system's interactions
with it that force the framework of the semantics to be probabilistic.
Having circuits that have a probabilistic rather than a deterministic interpreta-
tion is an extension that may be considered, but this appears to make the learning
task computationally less tractable [17]. There is little evidence that probabilistic
processes are central to human reasoning [49]. While we do not exclude extensions to
probabilistic representations, we do not consider them here.
4 Some Algorithmic Mechanisms
In this section we shall enumerate a series of algorithmic techniques for manipulating
knowledge in a system having the described architecture. We claim that these mech-
anisms address issues that are inescapable for large scale learning based AI systems.
The mechanisms described here arose in the main in studies of formal models of var-
ious specic phenomena. Our observation is that they can be brought together and
adapted to provide an overall methodology within a single framework.
4.1 Conict Resolution
The circuit units will contain large numbers of nodes. In general each one corresponds
to a concept or action, that has some reference to the world or to the internal con-
structs of the image unit. The semantics of each node can be dened in the PAC sense.
Let us suppose that each one when regarded separately, is highly accurate, correct
say on 99% of the natural input distribution. The problem that arises is that because
of the sheer number of nodes, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands, on almost any
one input a large number of the nodes will be inaccurate.
In a natural scene we may expect a certain moderate number of predicates that
are represented in the circuits to hold and the corresponding nodes to re. However,
the large numbers of remaining predicates will be represented with some inaccuracy,
a certain number of these additional nodes that should not re will do so also. Further
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some of these will be in semantic conict with the correct ones. They may recom-
mend inconsistent actions (e.g. \go left" as opposed to \go right") or inconsistent
classications (e.g. \horse" versus \dog".)
This is a fundamental and inescapable issue for which a technical solution is
needed. A conventional approach is to suggest that each node be given a numerical
\strength", and that in situations where several nodes re in conict the one with
highest strength be chosen to be the operative one. This approach clearly needs some
concrete technical mechanism for deriving the strengths. It also makes the assumption,
which needs justication, that a single totally ordered set of numerical strengths is
sucient for the overall resolving process.
Our approach is the following: we have a large number of circuit nodes, computing
functions x
1
;    ; x
n
, say, of the scene S. We assume that each x
i
is correct in the PAC
sense with high probability. Because of the sheer size of n, at any one time many of
the x
i
nodes will re falsely, and we need a mechanism for resolving among them.
The proposed solution is to have another set y
1
;    ; y
n
of nodes where y
i
corresponds
to x
i
. The purpose of y
i
is the following: When y
i
res this will be taken to assert
that x
i
is true, and further that x
i
is preferred over all the other x
j
that may be
ring. The implementation will have a circuit unit with x
j
(1  j  n) as inputs and
y
i
(1  i  n) as outputs, and with a connection from each x
j
to each y
i
. Each y
i
will
be a linear threshold functions of the x
j
. Thus if x
7
, when ring, is to be preferred to
all the x
j
except for x
2
; x
5
and x
8
, whose ring should override that of x
7
, then the
appropriate linear inequality to be computed at y
7
will be
x
7
  x
2
  x
5
  x
8
 1: (3)
This will have the eect that y
7
will re if and only if x
7
res and none of x
2
; x
5
or
x
8
res.
The force of this approach is two-fold. First, it is more expressive than the to-
tally ordered strengths regime. For each x
i
one can specify which x
j
dominate it,
independently of the other x
i
. Second, the representation needed for expressing the
preferences, namely linear threshold functions, are learnable in a very favorable sense
as further discussed in subsection 4.2 below.
We are therefore suggesting that the conict resolution problem can be solved by
learning the correct resolutions from examples of past behavior. The justication of
our architecture can be viewed as the possibility of repeated use of this same idea:
that learning can resolve many otherwise fundamentally problematic issues, and that
it can be realized eectively by the algorithms we describe. We chose to discuss the
conict resolution problem here, at the beginning, since it seems a particularly simple
and convincing instance.
14
4.2 Learning From Few Cases
The problem with advocating systems based on massive knowledge bases is that
one needs to specify mechanisms for coping with the issues of scale. In the previous
section, for example, we suggested that a learning mechanism for linear threshold
functions can address the issue of conict resolution. As we shall invoke learning as
the solution to a variety of other issues also, it is necessary to address the problem
that the learning process itself has to face in the presence of a massive knowledge
base.
The basic issue is fundamental and widely recognized. If there are n functions
represented in the system, and each one can depend on any of the n   1 others,
as a linear threshold (or some other) function, then there are potentially about n
2
parameters. Since n is large, say in the tens of thousands, n
2
is very large. With this
backdrop it is a remarkable fact that biological learning systems appear to be able to
learn from relatively few examples, certainly much fewer than reasonable estimates of
the n (or n
2
.) Some mechanism needs to be present to enable very high dimensional
systems to learn from numbers of interactions with the world that are very small
compared with this dimension.
The most relevant theory we know of how this can be done is that of attribute-
ecient learnability. The phenomenon here is that for certain function classes of n
variables one can prove that certain learning algorithms converge to a good hypothesis
after a number of examples that depends on n not linearly, the canonical situation
from dimensionality arguments, but much more slowly, sometimes logarithmically.
The phenomenon of ecient attribute ecient learning in the PAC sense was rst
pointed out by Haussler [13]. A striking and remarkable embodiment of this idea
followed in the form of Littlestone's Winnow algorithm [26] for learning linear thresh-
old functions. The algorithm is similar in form to the classical perceptron algorithm
except that the updates to the weights are multiplicative rather than additive. The
modication gives the algorithm the remarkable property that when learning a mono-
tone k-variable Boolean disjunction over fx
1
;    ; x
n
g the number of examples needed
for convergence, whether in the PAC or mistake-bounded sense, is upper bounded by
ck log
2
n, where c is a small constant, [26, 27]. Thus the sample complexity is linear
in k, the number of relevant variables, and logarithmic in the number of irrelevant
ones.
Littlestone's Theorem 9 [26] adapted to the case when coecients can be both
positive and negative (his Example 6) has the following more general statement; For
X  f0; 1g
n
suppose that for the functions g : X ! f0; 1g there exist 
1
; 
2
;    ; 
n

0 and 
1
; 
2
;    ; 
n
 0 such that for all (x
1
;    ; x
n
) 2 X
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Pn
i=1
(
i
x
i
+ 
i
(1  x
i
))  1 if g(x
1
;    ; x
n
) = 1
and
P
n
i=1
(
i
x
i
+ 
i
(1  x
i
))  1   if g(x
1
;    ; x
n
) = 0:
Then WINNOW2 with  = 2n and  = 1+=2 applied to the variable set (x
1
;    ; x
n
; 1 
x
1
;    ; 1  x
n
) makes at most the following number of mistakes:
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
2
n

+
 
5

+
14ln

2
!
n
X
i=1
(
i
+ 
i
): (4)
Here  and  are parameters of the algorithm and , which quanties the margin by
which positive and negative examples are separated, is a parameter of the distribution
of examples. For a monotone disjunction of k out of n variables, we can have 
i
= 1
for the k variables in the disjunction, with all the other 
i
= 0, and all 
i
= 0. Then
clearly  = 1. Hence (4) becomes O(k logn). In all these cases the algorithm can be
adapted so that it has similar bounds in the PAC model [27].
For linear inequalities of the form (3), we see that the particular example given is
equivalent to
1
4
(x
7
+ (1  x
2
) + (1  x
5
) + (1   x
8
))  1 so that  =
1
4
. In general if
there were k negative terms then  = 1=(k+1). In order to make the margin larger it
is better to learn the negation of (3), namely (1 x
7
)+x
2
+x
5
+x
8
 1 so that  = 1.
The generalization of this to k terms would also give  = 1 and hence the O(k logn)
bound.
It appears that some mechanism for attribute-eciency is essential to any large
scale learning system. The eectiveness of Winnow itself has been demonstrated in
a variety of experiments. A striking example in the cognitive domain is oered in
the work of Golding and Roth on spelling correction [11]. Even in the presence of
tens of thousands of variables, Winnow is able to learn accurately from few examples,
sometimes fewer than 100.
The question arises whether attribute ecient learning is possible for more ex-
pressive knowledge representations. Recently it has been found that this is indeed the
case. Under a certain projection operation attribute-ecient learning algorithms can
be composed to yield algorithms for a more expressive knowledge representation that
are still attribute ecient. In subsection 4.4 we shall discuss this further.
Finally, we note that attribute-ecient learning is closely related to the issue of
relevance, which has been widely discussed in the AI literature. Conventionally one
would expect to preprocess data to identify the attributes that are relevant to the
classication or action in question. One would then eliminate the irrelevant attributes,
and apply a learning algorithm to a database containing only the relevant ones. There
is, however, no evidence that biological systems have such an explicit preprocessing
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stage. Further, Winnow achieves the same overall eect implicitly, without explicitly
identifying which variables are irrelevant in a preprocessing stage. What it oers
therefore seems novel and important. (We note however that given an implicit method,
such as Winnow, one can with some eort, explicitly identify the relevant variables
by a binary search technique that needs about k logn applications of Winnow. This
is an observation of A. Beimel.)
4.3 Learning Relations
The important point about our representation of a relation R(x
1
;    ; x
k
) at a node is
its duality of nature. It is Boolean in the sense that at any instant the node either res
or does not re. On the other hand it is also relational in that at any instant it has
some binding  : fx
1
;    ; x
k
g ! fa
1
;    ; a


g, and the truth value taken depends on
whether the relation holds for this particular binding of the variables to the objects
in the image. This dichotomy exists also in other work on learning relations, such
as inductive logic programming [45], but needs to be addressed in a dierent way
here because of the circuit orientation. An overriding concern for us throughout is, of
course, that the complexity of manipulating relations be controlled (c.f. [46]).
Suppose we have a connection. R
1
(x
1
;    ; x
n
)! R
2
(y
1
;    ; y
k
) and an associated
connection binding that species x
1
= y
2
and x
2
= y
3
. What does a strong weight
on this connection mean? The interpretation of the semantics of circuit evaluation
dened in x 2.1 and x 2.2 implies that a strong weight means that for any scene and
any bindings of x
1
; x
2
to objects for which R
1
is true, it is the case that R
2
should
be \inclined" to be true also for any binding 
2
s.t. 
2
(y
2
) and 
2
(y
3
) agree with the
bindings of x
1
; x
2
. In other words, for any scene as far as the truth of R
2
is concerned
for any one binding 
2
; the only inuence of R
1
is via the question of whether there
exists some 
1
that makes R
1
true and agrees with 
2
on the object pairs specied in
the connection binding R
1
! R
2
.
Clearly we need to use the same semantics for learning as for evaluation. Further
this is easy to do. If R is a node with connections from R
1
;    ; R
m
and with m
corresponding connection bindings, then during learning we shall for each relational
example (i.e. a scene and a labelling of R for some or all bindings  of its variables)
evaluate R
1
;    ; R
m
for each binding of their own variables. An example for the
learning algorithm will then consist simply of truth values for R
1
;    ; R
m
and a truth
value for R. Hence the truth value taken of R is simply its truth value on . Also R
i
will be taken to be true if and only if there exists some binding 
i
of the variables of
R
i
that makes R
i
true and agrees with  on the connection binding R
i
! R.
If the learning algorithm learns a function (of R in terms of R
1
;    ; R
m
,) that is
consistent with the examples so presented, then the function that the resulting circuit
evaluates will be consistent with these examples.
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Given one relational example, the distribution of Boolean examples presented to
the learning algorithm is not necessarily uniquely determined. The case in which
all bindings of R are considered, and each given the same probability is only one
choice, be it a natural one. If the vast majority of bindings give negative values for
the truth of R, it may be advantageous for reasons of economy to sample from the
negative examples. Also, in the case that cycles are allowed and the evaluation process
recomputes a node several times, there are further choices to be made.
4.4 Learning More Complex Functions and Strategies
The previous section showed that the learning of linear inequalities with large margins
can be done attribute eciently, and therefore that mechanisms for doing that are
ideal building blocks for our architecture. Clearly the intention of our architecture is
that each new function that is learned or programmed be expressible in terms of old
ones already represented in the system in a reasonably simple way. When discussing
learning the crucial issue is how far removed the new function can be allowed to be
from the old ones already represented, without necessitating a learning capability
that is computationally intractable. In other words the issue is one of the granularity
of the relative complexity of the successive functions that can be learned.
From what we have said linear threshold functions oer a level of granularity that
is computationally attractive. The two questions raised therefore are: (1) is this level
of granularity suciently large to oer a convincing approach to building cognitive
systems and (2) can this granularity be enlarged (i.e. to richer knowledge representa-
tions) while retaining attribute ecient learnability.
Even when a function class is expressible as linear inequalities, this representa-
tion may be impractically large if many compound features need to be created. For
example, for Boolean variables fx
1
;    ; x
n
g each of the 2
2
n
Boolean functions can be
expressed as a disjunction of monomials over fx
1
;    ; x
n
; x
1
;    x
n
g and hence as a
linear inequality, but this requires a variable for each potential monomial, and there
are 3
n
of these.
Examples of function classes that can be expressed as inequalities over just n
variables are: disjunctions, conjunctions, and threshold-k functions. In the last case
we would have
n
X
i=1
z
i
 k
where z
i
is a variable over the reals that is given value 1 if x
i
= 1, and zero otherwise.
A further class that can be so expressed is that of 1-decision lists [41]. These test for
a sequence of literals y
i
1
;    ; y
i
m
where y
i
j
2 fx
1
;    ; x
n
; x
1
;    ; x
n
g: If the literal y
i
j
is true then the function is dened to be the constant c
j
for c
j
2 f0; 1g, otherwise
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yi
j+1
is tested. Decision lists can be expressed as linear inequalities over n variable
z
1
;    ; z
n
corresponding to x
1
;    ; x
n
. The size of the coecients grows exponentially,
however, with n. In the special case that most of the c
j
have one value, this growth
is more limited. In particular, it is shown in [55] that if c
j
has value 1 for d of the
m values of j then the decision list can be expressed as a linear inequality with
integer coecients, where the magnitudes of the coecients, and also their sum, is
upper bounded by (2m=d)
d
. If d << m then this is much better than the general
upper bound of 2
m
. Also, we see that this inequality can be expressed so as to t
the requirements of expression 4.2 for Winnow. We then have  = (2m=d)
 d
and the
sum of the magnitudes of the coecients bounded by 1, so that the mistake bound
is quadratic in (2m=d)
d
and logarithmic in n.
The question of characterizing the classes of linear inequalities that are learnable
attribute eciently remains unsettled. The possibility that decision lists can be so
learned has not been excluded.
Another question is whether attribute ecient learning can be achieved by classes
of functions beyond linear inequalities. A positive answer to this is provided by pro-
jection learning, which is is a technique that has been shown to extend the scope
of attribute ecient learnability. It allows algorithms that are attribute ecient to
be composed so as to obtain learning algorithms for more expressive representations
that are still attribute ecient. Since Winnow is the paradigmatic attribute ecient
algorithm currently known, the present applications of projection learning are based
on Winnow itself.
The basic idea is that for Boolean variables x
1
;   x
n
we dene a set J = f
1
;    ; 
r
g
of projections that each map f0; 1g
n
to f0; 1g. For example, we could have r = 2n
and for each literal ` 2 fx
1
;    ; x
n
; x
1
;    ; x
n
g we have a projection 
`
dened as

`
(x) = 1 i ` = 1 on x. This is the class of single variable projections. An alter-
native class has r = 2
k
with each member of J being a conjunction l
1
l
2
   l
k
where
l
i
2 fx
i
; x
i
g; i.e. if  = x
1
x
2
x
3
then (x) = 1 i x
1
x
2
x
3
= 1:
For each  2 J we consider the function f(x)(x). Clearly this equals zero for
x s.t. (x) = 0, and it equals f(x) otherwise. The hope is that for some of the
restrictions , the function f(x)(x) can be learned more accurately than f(x) can
directly, and that between the various choices of , the f(x)(x) that are learned do
cover the whole domain f0; 1g
n
of f(x).
Suppose that for the various choices of  2 J the function learned that approxi-
mates f(x) on (x) = 1 is f
0

(x). Then
P
f
0

(x)(x) is taken as the approximation of
f that has been learned. The main result in [55] states that if the f(x)(x) belong to
a class that is learnable attribute eciently on the restricted domain fx j ((x) = 1g
by an algorithm A say, and if a disjunction can be learned attribute eciently by an
algorithm B that shares certain specied properties with Winnow, then the function
P
f

(x)(x) can be learned attribute eciently, in the sense that the needed sample
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complexity depends linearly on the number of relevant 
0
s and the number of relevant
variables in all the f

, but only logarithmically on the total numbers r and n.
There is a variety of directions for which this can be used to extend attribute
ecient learning beyond linear threshold functions.
First, suppose that we learn a function of the form
P
2

J
f

(x)(x) where

J  J
for J the class of single variable projections, and f

are conjunctions. Then if the
conjunctions are assumed to be of length at most k, and the number of elements of

J is at most m, then the sample complexity of learning these will be linear in m
and k, and logarithmic in r and n. Furthermore, the circuit will need r nodes for the
various f

, n nodes for x
1
;    ; x
n
, and therefore rn weights to update, or O(n
2
) in
the case of single variable projections. Thus we are learning somewhat economically
a subclass of DNF formulae that have m monomials, each with at most k+1 literals.
To learn these via general (k + 1)-DNF learning methods [50] would be much more
expensive, and intractable if r and n are both large. For example, if we constructed
all the (k + 1)-monomials we would have about n
k+1
of them, which exceeds n
2
if
k > 1.
A second class of functions is given by
P
2R
f

(x)(x) where J is unchanged but
f is the class of disjunctions. Here the disjunctions will be assumed to contain at
most k literals, and the sum
P

to contain at most m nonzero terms. The result will
again be a subclass of DNF with at most 2 literals in each of the at most km terms.
While the overall complexity of learning this as a 2-DNF is not too dierent, it would
require an architecture with n
2
nodes, rather than the O(n) nodes needed here.
A third way that projection learning can be used is best viewed as an application
outside the architecture that is attribute ecient in a weaker sense. Consider a se-
quential covering algorithm, as in Rivest [41], for learning decision lists, or Khardon's
extension to propositional production rule systems [19]. In the simplest case such a
covering algorithm works as follows: it looks successively for a literal, say x
3
, that is
the most predictive single literal, in some sense, of the function f being learned. For
the case x
3
= 1 it will predict the most likely Boolean outcome for the function. For
the remaining subdomain, x
3
= 1 in this case, it will then repeat the process of nd-
ing the next most predictive literal. Proceeding in this way it will obtain a decision
list or production system. We can extend these algorithms by projection learning as
follows: Instead of looking for a best literal we look for a best projection  from a
class J . Also, instead of predicting the most likely result on the subdomain where
 = 1, we learn a new hypothesis for the subdomain  = 1, and in the decision list
structure substitute the learned function, say a conjunction or disjunction instead of
true and false, at that point in the list. The procedure is then repeated on the subdo-
main where either  = 0 or the last hypothesis is false. This learning procedure can
be viewed as attribute ecient if the learning algorithm used in the subdomains are
attribute ecient, and if J is chosen to be itself small. Thus a preliminary analysis,
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by, for example, simple Winnow may yield a candidate set of variables that are most
relevant (e.g. have high weights) and this small set may be chosen as the set J of
projections.
We note that the main motivation of projection learning is to learn more eectively
in cases in which a representation more complex than linear thresholds is needed. In
any one application domain we may have no a priori reason to believe that such a
representation is necessary. What we expect to nd is that projection learning will al-
ways yield at least as good results as simple Winnow, (possibly at the expense of more
examples) and may yield better results when linear representations are insucient.
An area in which complex representations may need to be learned is that of
strategies and plans. Here production systems are widely believed to have useful
expressivity [38]. Khardon has shown that a rich class of these can be learned using
decision list algorithms [13]. The dilemma here is that no attribute-ecient learning
algorithm is known for decision lists, unless the degree d is small, as explained in the
previous section. Hence we may have to look at the atter projective structures to
nd representations of such strategies that are learnable attribute eciently.
4.5 Learning as an Approach to Robustness
Systems will acquire knowledge both by inductive learning as well as by explicit pro-
gramming. Errors and inconsistencies may occur in either kind of input, and mecha-
nisms are needed for coping with these.
In the case of inductive learning the issue of noise has been studied extensively.
On the theoretical side a range of noise models have been considered, ranging from a
malicious adversarial model [3] to the more benign random classication noise model,
where the only noise is in the classication of the examples and this is random [3].
At least for the more benign models there are some powerful general techniques for
making learning algorithms cope with noise in some generality [16].
For the problem of learning linear separators there exist theoretical results that
show that there is no fundamental computational impediment to overcoming ran-
dom classication noise [5, 8]. Currently somewhat complex algorithms are needed
to establish this rigorously. In practice, fortunately, natural algorithms such as the
perceptron algorithm and Winnow, or the linear discriminant algorithm, behave well
on natural data sets which are often noisy, and for which there is no a priori reason
to believe that linear thresholds should work at all. This empirical evidence lends
credence to the use of linear threshold algorithms for complex cognitive data sets.
When knowledge is acquired by programming the issue of coping with noise also
arises. The view we take here is that we use the same PAC semantics for programmed
rules as for inductively learned rules. Thus the system would have high condence in
a rule that agreed with many examples. A programmed rule is therefore one which is
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treated as a working hypothesis, and easily discarded if evidence builds up against it.
In addition to the opportunity to discard rules there is also one for rening them.
Thus we may have programmed rules P ) R and Q ) :R as working hypotheses,
but discover that they do not hold in all cases. In particular, it may happen that in
some relatively rare cases both P and Q hold and therefore the rules contradict each
other. It may be that after suciently many observations it is found that P ^Q) :R
is a reliable rule. In that case we would rene P ) R to P ^:Q) R. The main point
is that the dilemma that arises from two potentially contradictory rules is resolved by
learning, even in the case that the original rules themselves are programmed rather
than learned.
4.6 Learning as an Approach to the Problem of Context
It has been widely observed that rules that express useful commonsense knowledge
often need qualication { they hold only in certain contexts. Thus a rule Q ) R
may hold if context P is true, but not necessarily otherwise. Frames in the sense of
Minsky [33] can be viewed as contexts that have a rich set of associated rules. The
PAC semantics of such a rule is that on the subdomain in which P holds, Q ) R is
the case, at least with high probability. In our architecture the simplest view to take
is that it can cope easily with a context P if it has a node for recognizing whether
an input satises P . If there is a node in a circuit unit that recognizes P , then a
subcircuit that implements P^Q) R will implement exactly what is wanted, the rule
Q) R applying in the subdomain in which P holds. The question remains as to how
domain sensitive knowledge can be learned. One answer is suggested immediately by
projection learning; each concept R that is learned is also learned for the projections
dened by every other concept P that has been previously learned or programmed.
Thus if we have nodes for P and R then a complex set of conditions Q that guarantee
R in the context of P can be learned from examples, for any P and R. This would
be, of course, computationally onerous unless the choice of P is restricted somehow.
4.7 Learning as an Approach to Incomplete Information and
Nonmonotonic Phenomena
Systems that attempt to describe the world declaratively run into methodological
problems that arise from the fact that at any time there will be captured only incom-
plete knowledge about the world. The diculty is that such systems need to take a
generic view of how to treat incomplete information { they need a uniform theory,
such as circumscription or the closed world assumption that takes positions on how
to resolve the unknown [10, 29, 31].
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PAC circuit semantics oers an advantage here { it resolves the unknown sepa-
rately in each case by using information learned from past experience of cases where
similar features to the case in hand were similarly unknown. A motivating observation
here is that gates in a circuit take values at all times. Consider the paradigm of non-
monotonic reasoning exemplied by the widely discussed example of the bird called
Tweety [10] . The system is invited to take positions on whether Tweety ies both
before and after it is revealed to it that Tweety is, in fact, a penguin. Suppose that in
a brain, for example, there is a two-valued gate intended to recognize penguins. This
would take value 1 say, when a penguin is identied, in the PAC sense, and 0 when
what is seen is identied in the PAC sense as not being a penguin. However, this gate
must also take some value in cases where conventionally one would say that the sys-
tem has not determined whether the object in question is a penguin or not. Suppose
that in these cases the gate takes the value 0. Then we could say that a 1 value means
fpenguing and a 0 means fnot penguin, undeterminedg. In this sense circuits repre-
sent internally the three cases fyes, no, undeterminedg even if no explicit provision
has been made for the third case. This means that learning and rule evaluations in
the system are carried out with a semantics in which the undetermined value of each
variable is represented. This is true both when a predicate is represented by a single
gate having just two possible values (whether representing fyes, undeterminedg/fnog
or fyesg/fno,undeterminedg by the two values) and also when there is a more explicit
representation, say by a pair of binary gates whose four possible values do distinguish
fyesg, fnog, and fundeterminedg. Hence once the system has reached stability in
learning it will cope with instances of incomplete information exactly as it does with
ones with complete information [52]. One could say further that in natural learning
systems instances of incomplete information are the natural ones, and usually the
only ones available.
Pursuing this example further, suppose that the system has a rule \bird = 1 and
penguin = 0 ) ies = 1". Suppose also that the gates \bird", \penguin", and
\ies" all have value 0 if the truth of the corresponding predicate is undetermined
in the system. Suppose further that this rule has been found to be consistent with
most natural cases experienced by the system in accordance with the probability
distribution D that describes the external world. It will then follow that for instances
in which birdhood is conrmed but penguinhood is undetermined, it will be a reason-
able conclusion that ies will be true and that the corresponding gate should indeed
have value 1 to indicate that. This will be a valid inference since the same was true
for past cases in the PAC sense. Thus the undened is resolved here by learning from
the real world distribution D, as seen through the feature set of the system. In this
example D captured the fact that in the particular source of examples to which this
system was exposed, in the majority of cases where a bird was identied but nothing
was said about penguinhood, the bird did indeed y.
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In articial systems, of course, the undened value  may be treated more explic-
itly. For example, gates may take three values f0; 1; g, or, closer to the spirit of our
architecture, the three values may be represented by a pair of binary gates.
Defaults may be viewed from this same perspective. Ignorance of the value of a
predicate is rightly interpreted as not relevant to the value of another if in natural past
cases of ignorance of the former, a certain consequence was true with high probability
for the latter. We regard defaults as rules where certain predicates are assumed to
have the undetermined value in the precondition. Their validity arises from the fact
that they had proved accurate in the past, or that they could be deduced from those
that had. Further examples are given in [43, 52, 53].
4.8 Reasoning
Much eort has been put into seeing whether the various formalisms that have been
suggested for reasoning in AI, at least those outside the probabilistic realm, can be
formulated within predicate calculus. The general answer found to this question is in
the armative, in the sense that many of the various alternative formalisms, including
those based on graph models, can be reexpressed in terms of the predicate calculus.
Some of these alternative formalisms, and the necessary transformations are described
by Russell and Norvig [45].
Instead of reformulating this body of work so as to t in with our architecture, we
will be content here to claim that a substantial part of it can be supported directly
without change. In particular, we described an implementation of our architecture
that can support modus ponens on Horn clauses. It follows that our architecture can
do reasoning in all these frameworks whenever the translation results in Horn clauses.
Further, it can do this by simple circuit evaluation of the contents of an image.
In addition, our architecture has capabilities for reasoning beyond those provided
by circuit evaluations alone. In particular, the circuits and the image units can be used
together more proactively within the reasoning process. The evaluation of a circuit
may result in various actions on the image, such as the addition of further objects,
the addition of statements of further relationships, or the deletion of an object. Thus
a circuit may cause the execution of a step of a more complex reasoning strategy.
In evaluating a scene, a circuit may add an object representing something already
in the scene but at a later time, and add a relationship that expresses the future
condition of the object. In other words the circuits may be able to depict a likely
scenario following on from the current one. The way the future scenario is depicted
can depend critically on the current one. In other words we need circuits that are able
to make useful modications to the scene in a highly content dependent manner.
The upshot is that the circuits will contain, in addition to information about
the external world as implied in previous sections, further information that concerns
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the strategies that are to be used for the internal deliberations of the system. These
deliberations will be seriously restricted, of course, by computational constraints, such
as limits on the number of objects allowed in a scene.
4.9 System Design
It has been asked whether in our architecture one still has to design AI systems,
exactly as in the old way, and all that is oered in addition are some mechanisms
for the automatic adjustment of weights. While in some sense the answer to this is
yes, the more important point is that the learning capability oers things that are
qualitatively dierent. First it provides a behavioral semantics. Further it oers a
unied methodology for dealing with conict resolution, nonmonotonic phenomena,
incomplete information, robustness, and the problem of context among others. Above
all, it oers a viable approach for infusing knowledge into a system in bulk.
Clearly conventional design principles oer a start in designing systems in this
domain also. In a programmed system one expects to construct various modules for
various functionalities, and have these interface with each other. In particular, one
may have a hierarchy of functions, lower level ones processing the inputs directly, and
higher level ones processing the outputs of the lower level ones. Thus an acyclic graph
of circuit units, in which some low level modules mimic the modules that would be
used in, say, a language system, is one possible starting point.
There are also some design choices that are unique to the architecture. For creating
new compound features there are various possibilities. Because of the centrality of
attribute ecient learning algorithms, an obvious method is to generate large numbers
of combinations in a systematic simple way. Any relevant ones so discovered will be
valuable, and the irrelevant ones will do little harm. One approach is to generate
for any variable set the set of conjunctions of all pairs of them. Another choice is
to create conjunctions of just those pairs that occur with high correlation. More
generally one can generate some set of polynomialy generable combinations [51]. The
intention is that large numbers of variables, even if most are irrelevant, will not
degrade performance in the presence of attribute ecient learning algorithms.
We are suggesting that the way to evaluate this architecture is by experimentation.
In that connection we note here one aspect. Most general approaches to AI attempt to
describe a uniform method for building a knowledge base starting from a blank slate.
Facts and reasoning about the most universal concepts such as time and space are
then formalized in the same framework as is more specialized knowledge (e.g. [25]).
In the neuroidal framework there is room reserved for treating the universal concepts
dierently from the others. In particular, the features and inverse features of the
image units can be used to implement eciently certain universal knowledge, such
as to do with low-level visual processing, and reasoning about time or space. These
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functions may be complex and specialized enough that implementing them directly
in the same framework as the more general knowledge would introduce unnecessary
diculties. Thus interpreting a depiction of a three dimensional scene may be done
in the rst instance by computational mechanisms that are preprogrammed in the
image units and expert at that task, and are possibly totally unrelated to the more
general knowledge manipulation capability of the circuit units. This dichotomy may
be analogous to that in biological systems between knowledge available at birth and
acquired during evolution, and that learned during life. However, we expect that some
circuit units will be programmed and do not exclude the possibility that some image
unit functions are learned.
The choice of what features to implement in the input devices and image units
poses signicant questions. In current machine learning applications the choice of
feature set is often critical to success. This phenomenon is probably accentuated
when we scale up to more general cognitive problems. In particular, the training data
may have to match the chosen feature set in some way. If, as is most likely, the feature
set chosen is signicantly dierent from that used by the human nervous system, the
teaching materials that will succeed can be expected to be dierent from those that
are eective for teaching humans.
5 Validating the Architecture
What we are claiming is that several of the generic diculties that have been encoun-
tered in designing scalable AI systems are technically solvable within the described
architecture. To give convincing evidence for this claim one would need to construct
a system that uses general knowledge on the scale and with the success envisioned
here. A rst experimental question, therefore, is how this architecture might be boot-
strapped to create a system whose performance in some cognitive area is indisputably
superior to existing ones.
In designing a system important choices need to be made regarding the feature
detectors of the images and of the input devices. If the main source of information
for the system is visual, for example, then problems with interpreting visual inputs
are likely to be inherited by the system. Our view is that the building of a database
that would comprise the rst level of internal knowledge in the system for such cir-
cumstance will have to be pursued in a careful and purposeful manner. It would have
to acknowledge and compensate for the poverty of what we might be able to pro-
gram currently as feature detectors. The Golding-Roth paper [11] is a good example,
however, of how one might start. They take a linguistic corpus and create complex
features out of single words, grammatical parts of speech of single words, and boolean
conjunctions of these for sets of words that occur in close proximity in the text. Such
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features, though articial, do capture useful information about meaning beyond what
can be gleaned from examining each word in isolation. By using such a set of features
they are able to learn to disambiguate certain pairs of words that humans often con-
fuse. Although the feature set is imperfect and articial, the system is able to create
a useful level of knowledge that is a level of abstraction above the individual words.
By analogy one would hope to build a larger knowledge base in a succession of
similar steps. This would be done by a managed combination of inductive training
operations, and the use of programmed knowledge as contained, for example, in dic-
tionaries. We believe that learning will need to play a large part of the overall task
if we are to achieve the various kinds of robustness discussed in this paper. Purely
programmed systems would appear to have an inherent limitation in this regard.
It is quite likely that if all this is to be achieved, natural language inputs will
play a major role. Corpora suitably annotated with the appropriate levels of knowl-
edge will have to be created. Substantial infrastructure will need to be manufactured
to provide the teaching materials for these systems. This would compensate for any
shortcoming in the range of preprogrammed features that we are able to realize. Al-
though large amounts of reliable knowledge are already available in linguistic format,
there are many obstacles to preparing or selecting useful linguistic teaching mate-
rials. Much commonsense knowledge is nowhere encoded, and much text produced
by humans contains linguistic constructs that are currently dicult for machines to
analyze. These facts make the preparation of the teaching materials challenging, but,
we believe, not insurmountable
6 Conclusion
We have described a series of arguments that suggest that many of the problems
that have been identied as obstacles to AI at a conceptual level, can be solved
if one gives inductive learning a suitable central role. In this respect the proposed
architecture diers from other general approaches to cognitive architectures that have
been described, such as [1], [37], and [38], in which inductive learning plays a much
smaller role.
We note that our use of PAC semantics suggests a modied Turing test. His basic
criterion for whether a machine could think was that the performance of the machine
should be indistinguishable from that of a human to an interrogator communicating
via a teleprinter [47]. The signicance of this informally stated criterion is that it is a
purely behavioral one. What PAC semantics oers is a precise way of formulating such
behavioral criteria. In particular it insists that both the task being learned, and the
distribution of inputs over which learning is performed and performance measured,
need to be identied.
27
The tasks in which we are interested here are those involving a large amount of
knowledge that has not been systematized into an exact science. A possible area in
which one might hope to test the performance of a system at such a task is that of
intelligent word processing. One can imagine a word processor that not only detects
misspelled words, but does a succession of more and more intelligent tasks, such as
suggesting alternative words and phrasing, or noting confusions or inconsistencies,
much as a teacher marking an essay might. There appears to be a continuum of
tasks of increasing diculty in this area. Even when restricted to the disambiguation
tasks previously mentioned, systems could invoke more and more world knowledge
in their suggestions, and their perceived performance would increase correspondingly.
One can imagine experiments in which commentary to writers is provided variously
by humans and machines, and the writers' task is to distinguish which one was the
case. Such an instance of a modied Turing Test would therefore refer to a concrete
real world distribution of cases generated, for example, by twelve year old students,
and created independently of the context of the test. Each such distribution would
dene a dierent task and therefore a dierent test. For an empirical validation of
our architecture one would need to show that systems can be built that pass such
specic tests of ever higher levels of diculty.
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